Relationships

Prepare for difficult people ahead of time

At daybreak say to yourself: I shall meet a busybody, an ungrateful person, an insolent one, a deceitful one, an envious one, an unsociable one. All these traits have come to characterize them through ignorance of good and evil. But I, having contemplated the nature of the good, that it is noble, and of evil, that it is shameful, and the nature of the very person who does wrong, that he is akin to me—not of the same blood or seed, but sharing in mind and a divine portion—can neither be harmed by any of them, for no one will involve me in what is shameful; nor can I be angry with my kinsman or hate him. For we have come into being for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. Therefore, to work against one another is contrary to nature; and resentment and turning away are contrary actions.

Marcus Aurelius · Ad Se Ipsum · 2.1.1

Exploring the idea

This passage can be read as a morning exercise in moral perspective: before the day begins, the speaker prepares for the certainty of difficult people and tries to disarm surprise, resentment, and self-pity in advance. The key move is not to deny that others can be rude, deceitful, or hostile, but to relocate the real danger. On this reading, their conduct is traced to confusion about what is truly good and bad, while genuine harm lies in being pulled into ugliness of character oneself. That is why the response is not passivity so much as refusal of contamination: another person may obstruct, insult, or provoke, but cannot force one into baseness unless one cooperates inwardly. The appeal to shared reason and a “divine portion” gives this ethical claim a broader frame, suggesting that beneath bad behavior there remains a deeper kinship that makes hatred feel like a violation of what human beings are for. The body-part comparisons sharpen that point. Feet, hands, eyelids, and teeth have different roles and can press against one another, yet they belong to one functioning whole; so too human beings are pictured as made for cooperation even when friction occurs. A plausible reading, then, is that the passage urges disciplined solidarity rather than sentimental approval: one may still resist harmful actions, but should do so without treating the wrongdoer as alien in essence. That said, there are limits to this reading. The claim that others act from ignorance can sound charitable, but it may also seem to understate malice, injustice, or structural harm; and the insistence that one cannot be harmed may feel truer at the level of moral character than at the level of bodily, social, or political injury. So the passage is perhaps most persuasive as a practice for governing one’s own anger, less as a complete account of all the ways people can wound each other.

A moment from everyday life

You wake up to tense messages in a family or friend group chat: someone is being sarcastic, another is ignoring what was actually said, and you can feel yourself drafting a reply that will escalate things. A practical use of this passage is to expect some friction before you enter the conversation, so you are less shocked by it and less likely to let someone else’s tone decide your own. That can mean pausing, answering only the useful part, or setting a boundary without adding another layer of contempt.

Another perspective

One way to see the moment is that difficult behavior does not have to make you act out of character, and that even people who are frustrating are still part of the same human circle rather than pure enemies. Still, someone else might reasonably think this approach risks being too charitable in situations where patterns of harm are serious, manipulative, or ongoing; in those cases, distance or firmer limits may be wiser than continued engagement.

A question to sit with

What would change in one strained relationship if you prepared for imperfection ahead of time, without assuming you must excuse it?

Original text & source

Ἕωθεν προλέγειν ἑαυτῷ· συντεύξομαι περιέργῳ, ἀχαρίστῳ, ὑβριστῇ, δολερῷ, βασκάνῳ, ἀκοινωνήτῳ· πάντα ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν ἐκείνοις παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ἐγὼ δὲ τεθεωρηκὼς τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι καλόν, καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὅτι αἰσχρόν, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντος φύσιν ὅτι μοι συγγενής, οὐχὶ αἵματος ἢ σπέρματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας μέτοχος, οὔτε βλαβῆναι ὑπό τινος αὐτῶν δύναμαι· αἰσχρῷ γάρ με οὐδεὶς περιβαλεῖ· οὔτε ὀργίζεσθαι τῷ συγγενεῖ δύναμαι οὔτε ἀπέχθεσθαι αὐτῷ. γεγόναμεν γὰρ πρὸς συνεργίαν ὡς πόδες, ὡς χεῖρες, ὡς βλέφαρα, ὡς οἱ στοῖχοι τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὀδόντων. τὸ οὖν ἀντιπράσσειν ἀλλήλοις παρὰ φύσιν· ἀντιπρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ ἀποστρέφεσθαι.

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The interpretation and contemporary examples are editorial readings, offered as a starting point for your own reflection.